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BOOKS RECEIVED
Lessons from the Trial. By Gerald F. Uelmen. Kansas
City, Kansas: Andrews and McMeel, a Universal Press Syndi-
cate Company. 1996. Pp. 223. Hardcover.
After all the criticisms and discord surrounding the case
of the People v. O.J. Simpson, Lessons from the Trial is the
book that needed to be written. It takes all the provocative
aspects of the trial and gives a perspective on them not given
by the daily, play-by-play news reports. People angry or con-
fused by the behavior of the lawyers, the focus on Mark Fuhr-
man, the media coverage or the verdict will want to read this
book. Most important, the author cool-headedly analyzes the
many reform proposals inspired by the trial. It can only be
hoped that everyone will consider these proposals with the
same integrity and clarity of thought before making any dras-
tic changes.1
The truly surprising thing about this "O.J. book" is its
personable and honest tone. As much as he openly criticizes
many of the players, including himself, the author treats
everyone with respect. He gives credit where due and pro-
tects the privacy and reputations of the witnesses and jurors.
The book is engagingly written, and should appeal to
lawyers and non-lawyers alike, but one warning is in order:
The author is a scholar, and there are a few passages too
technical for the non-lawyer. I suggest the reader simply
skim through them-they only last for a few paragraphs. In
other places, the author's scholarly references are well ex-
plained and create the feeling that the reader is in good
hands.
1. Gerald F. Uelmen is a Professor and former Dean at Santa Clara Uni-
versity School of Law in California. He is the co-author of two collections of
legal humor, and has written a casebook on drug abuse law as well as many
articles concerning drug abuse, the death penalty, legal ethics and related top-
ics. His clients have included Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers trial and
Christian Brando.
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Lessons From the Trial is laid out as a series of fifteen
chapters, each teaching certain principles demonstrated in
the trial. This review seeks only to briefly summarize a few
of the points made.
RACE AND THE VERDICT
The author does our society a great service in his discus-
sion of the jury's verdict. Other O.J. books have simply joined
the public in bashing the jury,2 but Lessons from the Trial
takes the opportunity to give us a reasoned analysis. The au-
thor does not assume that the verdict was motivated by racial
animosity. As he explains, such an assumption is itself ra-
cist. It is racist to assume that black Americans are without
conscience and would free a murderer just because he is
black. It is also racist to assume that black jurors are incapa-
ble of reasoning and therefore incapable of applying the stan-
dard of reasonable doubt. As the author explains:
By every objective measure, it appears that the jury in the
case of People v. O.J. Simpson did precisely what they
were sworn to do. They rendered a verdict based on their
evaluation of the evidence. The doubts they entertained
were reasonable doubts. To say that their doubts were
less than "reasonable" because nine of the jurors were Af-
rican-Americans is blatant racism .... [When we engage
in jury-bashing we] deliver the message that the value of
a juror's opinions is to be measured by his or her race, and
the value of a verdict is to be measured by public opinion
polls.3
While he does not believe the jury was racist, the author
does not claim race played no role. According to the author,
race is "an important factor that affects [a person's] entire life
experience, and life experience affects every judgment we
make."4 It is in this way that race played a role in the jury's
verdict. As the author explains, it makes perfect sense that
2. Chris Darden's criticisms in his book, In Contempt, are probably among
the most disturbing. In the very first paragraph, he accuses the jury of deliver-
ing its verdict merely to settle some racial "score." CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN &
HESS WALTER, IN CONTEMPT 3 (1996). Later, he complains about five people
who'd been dismissed from the jury, and even mentions them by name. Id. at
303-05. One of these jurors was dismissed for not revealing during voir dire that
she had been raped and beaten by her husband. Darden not only names her,
but calls her a liar. Id. at 304.
3. GERALD F. UELMEN, LESSONS FROM THE TRIAL 184-85 (1996).
4. Id. at 81.
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the life experiences of jurors from South Central Los Angeles
could make them open to the idea that police can lie. In fact,
after Detective Mark Fuhrman's performance in the trial, the
whole country has become more open to that idea.
Instead of bashing the jury, the author finds good reason
to praise it. When deliberations began, the jury was 10-2 for
acquittal, and apparently the two jurors who wanted to con-
vict were quickly convinced that the other jurors' doubts were
reasonable. 5 Although the jurors were criticized for deliber-
ating only four hours, the author explains that they were sim-
ply following the law. The jurors could not have delayed de-
livering their verdict just because they felt it would make the
public happier. To do so would have been to violate their
duty not be swayed by what the public might think of their
verdict. Johnnie Cochran was harshly criticized for urging
the jury to "send a message" to the Los Angeles police depart-
ment, but according to the author, the message the jury sent
was the proper one. He saw the message as simply being
this: a responsible jury will only find guilt when the prosecu-
tion's evidence is trustworthy.6
The author notes that while this jury acted properly,
there have been many cases where innocent blacks were con-
victed because of jury racism. Unfortunately, he does not
have to reach into the distant past to find an example. He
relates a 1980 capital murder case in which an openly racist
district attorney's office used perjured testimony and a cur-
sory police investigation to prosecute a black defendant. The
trial occurred before the Supreme Court held that jurors
could not be excluded on the basis of race,7 so the District
Attorney's office was free to follow its policy of excluding all
5. The jury seems to have thoroughly understood the concept of reasonable
doubt. After the trial, one juror said she thought Simpson was "probably" guilty,
but that "beyond a reasonable doubt" was the standard, not "probably." Id. at
180.
6. On the other hand, the author is perhaps stretching a bit when he ex-
plains why one juror raised his fist in salute after the end of the trial. Some
people saw it as a Black Power salute and a gesture of defiance, but the author
explains it as a celebration of the "reality [that] no man's liberty will be taken
by the state unless his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 7.
Between these two extremes, this observer saw it as an expression of relief that
the trial was finally over.
7. In 1986 the Supreme Court held the Equal Protection clause prohibits a
state from challenging black potential jurors merely because of their race. Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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black jurors whenever a defendant was black. In what the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would later call a subver-
sion of justice, the all-white jury convicted and the man was
sentenced to death. Shortly before his execution, new evi-
dence came to light and the conviction was finally set aside in
1989.8 The author finds it ironic that this case inspired no
media uproar and no petition drive to change the jury sys-
tem.9 He does not suggest that past injustice against black
defendants excuses injustice in their favor today. Instead he
merely suggests that:
[T]he widespread conclusion of many white Americans
that justice failed when O.J. Simpson was acquitted may
not be based entirely on an objective evaluation of the evi-
dence. It may be based on unfair suspicion of the motives
of the jury, which is rooted in our own racial attitudes.
Before we embark on an agenda of "jury reform," we need
to search our souls and ask what we are proposing to re-
form? Are we restricting the power of the American jury,
because that power is now within the grasp of those whose
motives we distrust? Where does that distrust come
from?10
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The right of the People to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.11
Another important contribution this book makes is in its
discussion of our basic constitutional rights. To understand
the discussion of Simpson's motion to suppress the evidence
gathered from his home during two police searches, it is nec-
8. Id. at 191 (referring to Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989)).
9. The Simpson verdict inspired a California initiative called the 'Public
Safety Protection Act of 1996" which would abolish the requirement that jury
verdicts be unanimous. Id. at 184. The author notes that such a change would
only shorten deliberations. If the measure had been in effect during the Simp-
son case, no deliberation would have been needed at all, since the jury started
out 10-2 in favor of acquittal. Id.
10. UELMEN, supra note 3, at 192.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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essary to have some background. Before the Revolutionary
War, general warrants were common. They allowed police to
enter any colonist's home and search for anything illegal.
Colonist felt that general warrants "[placed] the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer,"' 2 and the use
of general warrants was one of the reasons for the Revolu-
tion. To prevent police from simply entering a home and
rummaging for anything interesting, the Fourth Amendment
requires that warrants particularly describe any items to be
seized. This requirement is designed to protect "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men," the right to be let alone.13
Nevertheless, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches was often still violated in the United States, so, in
1961, the Supreme Court established the Exclusionary
Rule. 14 Under it, evidence obtained through an unconstitu-
tional search generally cannot be used in court.' 5 In addition
to providing some protection against illegal searches, the
Rule was also designed to protect judicial integrity. Some
people believe that it is beneath the dignity of a court to use
illegally obtained evidence.
Unfortunately, even the Exclusionary Rule does not do
much to prevent unconstitutional searches. The Los Angeles
police basically served a general warrant on June 28, 1994 in
their search of the Simpson home, when they rummaged
through the home for anything interesting. For example,
although video tapes were not particularly described on the
warrant, police seized several tapes and even watched them
on Simpson's VCR. Simpson challenged the search, but did
not win due to the many exceptions that have grown up
12. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE 135 (1991).
James Otis Jr. made this argument before the Boston superior court in 1761.
See generally id. at 134-36.
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966).
15. There are many exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule. For example, ac-
cording to Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), illegally obtained evidence may
be used if the police would have discovered the evidence even without the ille-
gality. Illegal evidence is also admissible if the police obtained it relying in good
faith upon a defective search warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984). In any case, the Exclusionary Rule only applies to substantive evidence,
so illegally obtained evidence can always be used to impeach a defendant's
statements made in response to cross-examination. United States v. Havens,
446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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around the Exclusionary Rule. However, the author does
give a good answer to those who believe that people with
nothing to hide should have no objection to being searched:
The assertion of one's constitutional right to privacy
should not be construed as a concession that one has
something incriminating to hide .... In insisting that
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department respect the
constraints of the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Simpson
clothed himself with the same protections available to
every individual, conceded to law enforcement everything
to which it was lawfully and honestly entitled, and de-
manded judicial integrity."16
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST COMPELLED
SELF INCRIMINATION
The Jury instructions in the People v. O.J. Simpson in-
cluded the following: 17
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right
not to be compelled to testify. You must not draw any in-
ference from the fact that a defendant does not testify.
Further, you must neither discuss this matter not permit
it to enter into your deliberations in any way.
The right against compelled self incrimination ensures
that the prosecution in a criminal case must prove the de-
fendant guilty "by its own independent labors, rather than by
the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from [the defend-
ant's] own mouth." 8 The right came to be protected by the
Constitution because it was felt that confessions obtained
through torture or psychological pressure offended human
dignity and the dignity of the court.' 9
On a more practical level, compelled confessions also
tend to be unreliable. There are instances of innocent people
confessing to crimes to escape being beaten or killed by po-
lice.20 People have even confessed to capital crimes because
they were scared and wanted to go home. 2' Although the
16. UELMEN, supra note 3, at 46.
17. Id. 156-57.
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
19. ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 11, at 172.
20. Laura Hoffman Roppe, Comment, True Blue? Whether Police Should be
Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 729, 739-40 (1994).
21. Id. at 773 n.10 (1994).
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right against compelled self incrimination is often seen as
merely shielding the guilty, the author demonstrates that
this is not the case."
O.J. Simpson did not refuse to take the stand because he
was unwilling to speak on his own behalf. He had undergone
practice cross examinations and had spoken well for himself.
Instead, he had valid strategic reasons for invoking the Fifth
Amendment. He did not want to be questioned about his six-
teen-year relationship with Nicole Simpson. There was a his-
tory of domestic violence, and therefore a danger the jury
might convict not because they had found Simpson guilty of
the murders but merely to punish him for the abuse. The de-
fense team also felt that Marcia Clark would spend weeks on
her cross-examination. With only two alternate jurors left,
this raised the possibility of a mistrial, and a mistrial would
have greatly harmed Simpson. While the prosecution has un-
limited resources, a defendant does not. Simpson had al-
ready nearly depleted his personal fortune on his legal de-
fense, and would face a second trial with far fewer resources.
The author points out that Fuhrman invoked the Fifth
Amendment to avoid opening himself up to prosecution for
perjury. Fuhrman had at first testified that he had not used
the term "nigger" within the prior ten years. 23 Later, Fuhr-
man was heard saying "nigger" at least forty-one times on
tape recordings made by scriptwriter Laura McKinny.24
Many might be offended by the author's comparing Simpson's
use of the Fifth Amendment with Detective Mark Fuhrman's
use of it. During the trial, it was angrily pointed out that
Simpson was on trial, not Fuhrman. However, in any trial it
is truly the evidence that should be judged, and Uelmen con-
vincingly argues that the jury should have been allowed to
learn enough about Fuhrman so that they could decide
whether his other testimony was trustworthy. Unfortu-
nately, the jury only heard two excerpts that did not begin to
convey the depth of Fuhrman's hatred toward blacks,25 nor
22. See also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Jus-
tice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV 21 (1987). Of particular inter-
est is the article's "Catalogue of Defendants" on pages 91-172 containing nu-
merous examples of innocent people being convicted of capital crimes, many of
them on the basis of their false confessions.
23. UELMEN, supra note 3, at 135.
24. Id. at 150.
25. Id. at 151-52.
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did they get to hear any of the eighteen instances on the
tapes where Fuhrman admits to planting evidence, lying to
protect other officers, beating suspects to get confessions, and
other police misconduct.26 Although the author does not be-
labor the point, his excepts from the Fuhrman tapes demon-
strate that Fuhrman hated blacks so much that any testi-
mony he gave against a black defendant should be suspect.
CONCLUSION
This review has merely touched on a little of what this
book has to offer. The author intelligently discusses such is-
sues as DNA evidence, cameras in the courtroom, and police
misconduct, always putting them in the context of this fasci-
nating case. People interested in the law will learn some-
thing about the ideals behind our legal system, practitioners
will be interested in learning the strategies the defense team
used, and law students will enjoy reading about a law profes-
sor in action.
Cristina Yu
Woe is I: The Grammarphobe's Guide to Better Eng-
lish. By Patricia T. O'Conner. New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's
Sons. 1996. Pp. 227. Hardcover.
The worst aspect of reviewing a book designed to aid the
grammatically challenged is the knowledge that someone will
inevitably find grammatical errors in the review itself. "Ah,"
the critical reader will exclaim, "either the book was not that
helpful, or the reviewer not too astute." In this instance the
latter observation is more likely correct. Patricia O'Conner
has written an enjoyable and illuminating little primer that
nearly everyone other than your fifth-grade English teacher
26. Id. at 142.
27. These examples demonstrate Fuhrman's profound hatred of blacks. Re-
garding a police station in the South Central Los Angeles area Fuhrman said,
"[1]eave that old station. Man, it has the smell of niggers that have been beaten
and killed in there for years." Id. at 142. Regarding famine in Ethiopia: "Let 'em
die. Use 'em. for fertilizer. I mean, who cares." Id. at 141-42.
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will find a useful companion to the dictionary, thesaurus and
Strunk and White1 already (hopefully) on his or her2 desk.
Whether drafting a brief, delivering a closing argument, or
corresponding with a client, proper grammar is as essential
to being a good legal practitioner as passing the bar exam-
and nearly as dreadful a reality to face. Too few attorneys
are truly competent, much less skilled, at this critical ele-
ment of communication. In the concluding chapter of Woe is I
the author states a trend all too common in the legal field
when she notes: "A venerable tradition, dating back to the
ancient Greek orators, teaches that if you don't know what
you're talking about, just ratchet up the level of difficulty and
no one will ever know." Little wonder that many of the au-
thor's examples are from the legal arena!
But to say proper grammar is critical is not to say it is
easy.3 Most of us find at least some element of grammar diffi-
cult to grasp, and I dare say a great many of us find ourselves
consistently haunted by more than one grammatical ghost.
As Ms. O'Conner explains in the introduction of Woe is I, the
English language possesses the largest lexicon of any lan-
guage, comprised of elements of Latin, French, Italian, Ger-
man, Spanish, Danish, Dutch, Portuguese, and Greek. Such
diversity makes for an extremely robust and potentially pow-
erful language, capable of conveying a multitude of ideas,
feelings, and nuances. However, this versatility comes with a
high grammatical price; to unlock even a portion of the Eng-
lish language's utility, we must first be able to use it properly.
Naturally, proper use is no easy task when you are deal-
ing not really with just one language, but an amalgam of
nearly a dozen. Woe is I assists the reader (more accurately,
the "user") in making grammatical sense of it all while avoid-
ing the technical jargon, sentence diagramming, and memori-
1. WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (3rd ed.
1979).
2. Did you think "their" was the proper pronoun to use with "everyone?" I
did- it isn't. See Chapter 1 of Woe is I.
3. Note for those who have been taught, as I, that it is improper to begin a
sentence with "But": There is no such rule, but enjoy your new found freedom
with caution. Writes O'Conner on pages 184-85:
Over the years, some English teachers have enforced the notion that
and and but should be used only to join elements within a sentence, not
to join one sentence with another. Not so. It's been common practice to
begin sentences with them since at least as far back as the tenth cen-
tury. But don't overdo it, or your writing will sound monotonous.
19971 1159
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
zation of seemingly nonsensical rules that caused most of us
to turn our attention elsewhere around the same time we hit
puberty. For the true novice, there is even a glossary describ-
ing basic terms such as "noun," "verb," and even "diction-
ary."4 Organized into an introduction and ten concise chap-
ters, all linked by a comprehensive index designed to
extricate the user from a multitude of grammatical quag-
mires, it is hard to believe that a book packing such a punch
fits between a cover only eight inches long, five inches wide
and a half inch thick!
The first chapter is entitled: "Woe is I: Therapy for Pro-
noun Anxiety." If you do not consider yourself afflicted before
reading the chapter, you might halfway through it when you
realize "who" and "whom" as well as "which" and "that" are
all pronouns. Still don't think you have a problem? Which is
correct: Nobody likes a dog that bites or Nobody likes a dog
which bites? O'Conner explains that many feel the words are
interchangeable or that "which" is more refined-neither is
true. In the above sentence (and more often than not gener-
ally), "that" is the correct pronoun. One of O'Conner's tricks
to identify the proper choice: "if you can drop the clause with-
out losing the point of the sentence, use which. If you can't,
use that." Similar simple, and largely effective, advice follows
for who and whom and other troublesome pronouns.5
Still feeling good? Try the second chapter, "Plurals
Before Swine." Even I felt I had a pretty good grasp of this
area-until I was forced to acknowledge I would call "two at-
torneys general" (correct form), "two attorney generals" (in-
correct). Among other things, this chapter teaches that the
most important root in a two-word phrase receives the plural
ending. Thus, it is "Mothers-in-law like to attend courts-mar-
tial," regardless of what you might think seems correct.
4. The definition of "dictionary" is more illuminating than you might im-
agine: "A book that lists words in alphabetical order and gives their meanings,
pronunciations, and origins - including words that aren't legit, like alright.
The fact that a word can be found in the dictionary doesn't mean it's all right.
Read the fine print." (Not surprisingly, a glance at the dictionary fine print
reveals "legit" itself is not legit).
5. Because I am certain at least some readers are curious about Ms.
O'Conner's advice regarding when to use "who" and when to use "whom," here
is one of her tricks: Use "who" where you could use "he" and use "whom" where
you could use "him."
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Troublesome news for those who, like me, think they "know"
grammar because they can tell what "sounds" right.
The third chapter, "Yours truly: The Possessives and the
Possessed," presents such conundrums as picking the correct
expression: "He resents my going," or "He resents me going."
The first is correct, the second is not. You wouldn't say "He
resents me departure," would you? As O'Conner points out,
the difficulty occurs when we are presented with an "ing"
word (invariably a verb variation) acting as a noun.6 The
trick is to see if you can substitute a noun (such as "depar-
ture," above) for the "ing" word and then treat it accordingly.
The quandary over what verb form to use in any particu-
lar phrase is the subject of chapter four, "They Beg to Disa-
gree: Putting Verbs in Their Place." As anyone who knows or
has attempted to learn a foreign language can attest, the verb
is the most complicated part of any sentence. Not only does
verb form vary according to the dimension of time referred to,
but it varies according to subject as well. Among the hints I
found most useful in this section concerned what to do when a
sentence contains both a singular and a plural subject with
one verb acting on both of them, such as: "neither the eggs nor
the milk [was or were] fresh." O'Conner resolves the problem
simply: if the subject nearer the verb is singular, the verb is
singular. Thus, it's "neither the eggs nor the milk was fresh,"
but "neither the milk nor the eggs were fresh."
Listing well over a hundred words, the fifth chapter,
"Verbal Abuse: Words on the Endangered List" helps restore
frequently misused and misspelled words to their proper
place. For example, "decimate" means literally "to slaughter
every tenth one," but can be used loosely to mean "destroy in
part." However, "decimate" should never be used to mean "to
destroy entirely." Between "farther" and "further," "farther"
should be used when referring to physical distance and "fur-
ther" to refer to abstract ideas or to indicate a greater extent
or degree. All of O'Conner's definitions are supported by con-
cise, helpful examples of proper and improper use. Frequent
reference to this section will greatly aid those of us who tend
to rely a little too much on our computer spell-checkers, as
O'Conner points out: "My spell-check software software tells
6. O'Conner's glossary reminds us that such words are properly known in
the grammatical trade as "gerunds." Unfortunately, knowing the correct term
does not insure proper use!
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me that restauranteur and judgement and straightlaced are
spelled correctly 7 . ... And it doesn't care how I use affect and
effect, as long as they're spelled right."
For those who rely on periods as the preferred form of
punctuation, O'Conner offers chapter six, "Comma Sutra:
The Joy of Punctuation." Using various traffic signals as
metaphors for different forms of punctuation (amply illus-
trated by example), the author effectively teaches us the dif-
ference between, for example, a period, a comma, and a
semicolon:
If a comma is a yellow light and a period is a red light, the
semicolon is a flashing red light-one of those lights you
drive through after a brief pause. It's for times when you
want something stronger than a comma but not quite so
final as a period.'
Although many of us have heard such metaphors before,
the author's multitude of examples greatly enhance their ef-
fectiveness. Once the reader is brought up to speed with ba-
sic punctuation, more advanced elements are discussed. It is
here the reader is reintroduced to the colon, dash, and
dreaded quotation mark. I hoped to find long-sought relief for
my quotation mark blues within the five pages O'Conner de-
votes to that subject, but it seems I will suffer indefinitely.
After reading Woe is I, The Elements of Style, and even the
Bluebook,9 I still find myself searching for an adequate expla-
nation of proper punctuation at the closing end of a quotation
in technical writing. Woe is I does indicate what to do with
most punctuation at the end of quotations, but nearly all ex-
amples refer to dialogue, not quotations from another's work
or where a word is enclosed in quotations to engender sar-
casm or skepticism.
I do not dare embarrass myself by attempting to explain
the concept of "danglers," but suffice to say they are as bad as
they are bountiful. Woe is I makes short work of these gram-
matical grievances in chapter seven, "The Compleat Dangler:
A Fish out of Water." Next, chapter eight, "Death Sentence:
7. Perhaps Ms. O'Conner needs a new spell-checker - mine correctly
identified these words as misspelled, and a good thing too, otherwise I would
probably get them wrong.
8. p. 139.
9. COLUMBIA LAw REVIEW, ET AL., THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION (15th ed. 1991).
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Do Clich6s Deserve to Die?" provides food for thought. Here
O'Conner makes short and humorous work of a host of worn-
out cliches that deserve to be excised from the English
language.
To this day I can hear a thousand red-inked English pa-
pers echoing phrases such as: "Always place the subject of a
sentence before the verb"; "Do not end a sentence with a prep-
osition"; and the much ballyhooed, "Split infinitive - re-
phrase." If such criticisms sound vaguely familiar, a sense of
poetic justice is provided by chapter nine, "The Living Dead-
Let Bygone Rules be Gone." Here we learn that many of the
grammatical "sins" endlessly taught in grade school are not
really incorrect at all.10 The author does a nice job of listing
these non-rules, tracing there origins, and providing some
important caveats.
O'Conner saves perhaps her best advice for the final
chapter. Here the reader is presented with a list of thirteen
"general principles," to assist in "writing what you mean."
While most of O'Conner's principles are familiar, they are
easier to remember than consistently apply. Chief among
them: "Be direct" (e.g. "We concluded that Roger's an idiot,"
not: "Our conclusion was that Roger's an idiot."); "Don't bela-
bor the obvious" (e.g. "I gave it away," not "I gave it away for
free."); and, perhaps most importantly, "Read with a feloni-
ous mind" (i.e. when you see a writing technique that works,
steal it!).
Some words of caution: First, Woe is I contains many ex-
amples of "bad" grammar that, while perhaps not a pitfall
prior to reading, can be contagious once presented (a neces-
sary evil in a book intended to reach a diverse audience of
grammarphobes); Second, because we are unaware of many
of our grammatical errors, Woe is I should not be merely
skimmed and then allowed to gather dust. This is a book to
be used again and again, not merely read. Indeed, as a desk
reference, many will prefer the modern and less demanding
tone of Woe is I to the more erudite style of Strunk and White.
This review provides merely a sampling of what Woe is I
offers. Mindful that I have violated more than a bit of Ms.
O'Conner's sage advice," I conclude with what perhaps
10. Including the much maligned double-negative exemplified above!
11. "General Principle" number three comes to mind: "Don't belabor the
obvious."
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should have been said in the beginning and left alone: This is
an excellent book, buy it.
Andrew R. Hull
